The strength of a random password is measured in entropy — the number of equally likely possibilities an attacker must search. Each character drawn uniformly from a 94-symbol printable set adds log2(94) ≈ 6.55 bits; from lowercase-only, 4.7 bits. A 16-character full-charset password is ~105 bits: beyond any realistic brute force, online or offline. This generator produces passwords with a cryptographically secure random number generator (the browser's crypto.getRandomValues), locally, with configurable length and character classes.

The CSPRNG detail is not pedantry. Math.random() is predictable — its state can be recovered from a handful of outputs, and passwords generated with it have been broken in the wild. Anything security-sensitive must come from an OS-level entropy source, which is exactly what Web Crypto provides.

Compare two policies: 8 characters from all 94 symbols (~52 bits) versus 16 lowercase letters (~75 bits). The 'simpler' long password is ~8 million times harder to brute-force. Complexity rules that force Symbol+Digit+Upper into 8 characters mostly push humans into predictable patterns (Password1!), which cracking dictionaries model explicitly — mangling rules like capitalize-first, append-digit are the first thing tools like hashcat try.

Modern guidance (NIST SP 800-63B) reflects this: prefer length (allow at least 64 chars), drop mandatory composition rules, drop periodic forced rotation (rotate on evidence of compromise), and check candidate passwords against known-breached lists instead.

Online attacks against a rate-limited login are slow (thousands of guesses/day) — nearly any random 10+ character password survives them. The real threat is offline cracking after a database leak: a single modern GPU tries ~10^10–10^11 MD5/SHA-1 hashes per second, and rigs scale linearly. At 10^12 guesses/second, a random 8-char full-charset password (94^8 ≈ 6×10^15) lasts under two hours on average; a random 14-char one (94^14 ≈ 4×10^27) outlasts the sun. The hash algorithm matters too — bcrypt/Argon2 slow attackers by factors of 10^4–10^6 — but you control your password's entropy, not the site's hashing.

• Use a password manager and generate a unique random password per site — reuse, not weakness, is how one breach cascades into account takeover everywhere (credential stuffing).
• Default to 16–20 characters with all classes for stored-in-manager passwords; length costs you nothing when autofill types it.
• For passwords you must type on a TV or console, prefer longer letters+digits over shorter with awkward symbols.
• Exclude ambiguous characters (l/1/I, O/0) only when a human must transcribe the password; otherwise keep the full set.
• Turn on MFA where offered — it converts 'password leaked' from catastrophe into inconvenience.